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Abstract
We reformulate an earlier model of the "Emergence of classes..." proposed
by Axtell et al. (2001) using more elaborate cognitive processes allowing a
statistical physics approach. The thorough analysis of the phase space and
of the basins of attraction leads to a reconsideration of the previous social
interpretations : our model predicts the reinforcement of discrimination
biases and their long term stability rather than the emergence of classes.
1 Introduction
During the 90’s social scientists introduced several thought provocative
models of social phenomena, most often using numerical simulations (multi-
agent simulations). These models have later been extended by methods and
concepts derived from statistical physics such as Master Equations and Mean
Field Approximation. A few examples include voters models and imitation
processes Nowak et al. (1990) and the review of Castellano et al. (2009) , El
Farol and the minority game (Arthur, 1994) and Challet et al. (2013), dif-
fusion of cultures (Axelrod, 1997) and (Castellano et al., 2000). Revisiting
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these models provided deeper insight, more precise results and even some-
times corrections.
The questions of the emergence and persistence of classes and discrimi-
nation received a lot of attention from social scientists, ethnographers and
economists, see e.g. (Bowles & Naidu, 2006) and references within. A very
inspiring model entitled "Emergence of Classes in a Multi-Agent Bargaining
Model" was proposed by Axtell, Epstein and Young (Axtell et al. (2001)).
We here propose to revisit their approach using a more elaborate model of
agent cognition and to compare a mean field approach to our agent based
simulation results.
2 The models
2.1 The original model of Axtell, Epstein and Young
Let us briefly recall the original hypotheses and the main results of Axtell,
Epstein and Young (Axtell et al. (2001)).
— Framework : pairs of agents play a bargaining game introduced by
Nash Jr (1950) and Young (1993). During sessions of the game, each
agent can, independently of his opponent, request one among three
demands : L(ow) demand 30 perc. of a pie, M(edium) 50 perc. and
H(igh) 70 perc. As a result, the two agents get at the end of the session
what they demanded when the sum of both demands is less than the
100 perc. total ; otherwise they don’t get anything. The corresponding
payoff matrix is written table (1). At each step a random pair of agents
is selected to play the bargaining game. The iterated game is played
for a large number of sessions, much larger that the total number of
agents which could then learn from their experience how to improve
their performance.
— Learning and memory : Agents keep records of the previous demands
of their opponents, e.g. for 10 previous moves.
— Choosing the next move : at each time step, pairs of agent are ran-
domly selected to play the bargaining game. They most often choose
the move that optimises their expected payoff using the memory of
previous encounters as a surrogate for the actual probability distribu-
tion of their opponent’s next moves. With a small probability ǫ, e.g.
0.1, they choose randomly among L, M, H.
The main results obtained by Axtell et al. (2001) from numerical simula-
tions are :
— They observe different transient configurations which they interpret
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as "norms", e.g. the equity norm is observed when all agents play M.
Because of the constant probability of random noise, the system never
stabilises on an attractor, even in the sense of Statistical Physics. The
duration of the transients increases exponentially with the memory
size and 1/ǫ.
— Their most fascinating result is obtained when agents are divided
into two populations with arbitrary tags say e.g. one red and one
blue. When agents take into account tags for playing and memorising
games (in other words when agents play separately two games, one
intra-game against agents with the same tag and another inter-game
against agents with a different tag) one observes configurations in the
inter-game such that one population always play H while the other po-
pulation plays L ; they interpret such inequity norm as the emergence
of classes, the H playing population being the upper class.
Equivalent results are obtained when agents are connected via a social
network as observed by (Poza et al., 2011) on a square lattice as opposed to
the full connection structure used by (Axtell et al., 2001). For some instances,
domains with different norms occupy different parts of the lattice. Otherwise,
one single domain of agents playing the same norm covers the entire lattice,
depending upon the initial conditions.
From now on, we follow a plan starting with the exposition of our own
model (section 2.2). The use of a mean field approximation allows to simply
describe the attractors of the dynamics and the different dynamical regimes
(section 3). These results are then compared with those obtained by direct
agent based simulations (section 4), including a thorough survey of the at-
traction basins. We further proceed with the analysis of the two tagged po-
pulations version (section 5). The discussion compares our results to those of
previous models and to magnetic systems. A short conclusion stresses the dif-
ference in interpretation of the models in terms of social phenomena (section
6).
2.2 The moving average and Boltzman choice cognitive
model
We start from the same bargaining game as (Axtell et al., 2001) with a
payoff matrix written in table (1), but using different coding of past expe-
rience (moving average of past profits) and choice function (Boltzman func-
tion).
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L M H
L 0.3 0.3 0.3
M 0.5 0.5 0
H 0.7 0 0
Table 1 – Payoff matrix of the Nash demand game. The first column re-
presents the move of the first player L, M or H . The first row represents
the move of her opponent. The figures in the matrix represent the payoff
obtained by the first player.
The present model is derived from standard models of reinforcement lear-
ning in cognitive science, see for instance Weisbuch et al. (2000).
Rather than memorising a full sequence of previous games, agents update
3 "preference coefficients" Jj for each possible move j, based on a moving
average of the profits they made in the past when playing j. J1 is the prefe-
rence coefficient for playing H , J2 for M and J3 for L. The updating process
following time interval τ after a transaction is :
Jj(t + τ) = (1− γ) · Jj(t) + πj(t), ∀j, (1)
The decrease term in 1 − γ corresponds to discounting the importance of
past transactions, which makes sense in an environment varying with the
choices of the other players. πj(t) is the actual profit made during the chosen
transaction j ; the 2 other Jj′ corresponding to the 2 other choices j
′ are
simply decreased.
These preference coefficients are then used to choose the next move in the
bargaining game. Agents face an exploitation/exploration dilemma : they can
decide to exploit the information they earlier gathered by choosing the move
with the highest preference coefficient or check possible evolutions of profits
by trying randomly other moves. Rather than using a constant rate of random
exploration ǫ as in Axtell et al. (2001), the probability of choosing demand
j is based on the logit function :
Pj =
exp(βJj)∑
j exp(βJj)
, ∀j, (2)
where β, the discrimination rate, measures the non-linearity of the relation-
ship between the probability Pj and the preference coefficient Jj. Large β
values results in always playing the choice j with the largest Jj, small β va-
lues to indifference among the three choices. Economists use the name logit
for the Boltzmann distribution. We have earlier shown Nadal et al. (1998)
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that the Boltzmann distribution can be derived by maximising a linear com-
bination of expected profits and information gained through exploration, see
(Bouchaud, 2013) for a thorough discussion.
Comparing our model with the one proposed by (Axtell et al., 2001) :
— The moving average corresponds to a gradual rather than abrupt de-
crease of previous memories, it is based on agent’s own experience in
terms of profit rather than the observation of her opponents’ moves
and it uses less memory.
— Boltzman choice has a random character as the constant probability
noise introduced in (Axtell et al., 2001), but furthermore the choice
depends upon the differences in experienced profits ; we might expect
agents to be less hesitant when their previous experience resulted in
very different preference coefficients.
3 The mean field approximation
3.1 Derivation of the mean field approximation
The difference equation (1) can be changed to a differential equation in
the limit of a slow dynamics :
dJj
dt
= −γJj(t) + πj(t) (3)
where the time unit is the average time between the agent’s bargaining pro-
cesses. πj(t) is the profit made by the agent if he chose demand j.
The Mean Field approximation consists in replacing πj(t) by its expected
value < πj >, thereby transforming the stochastic differential equation into
a deterministic differential equation.
The time evolution of Jij is thus approximated by the following set of
equations :
dJj
dt
= −γJj+ < πj > (4)
where < πj > is given by :
< πj >=
∑
i πij exp(βJi)∑
i exp(βJi)
; (5)
j is the agent’s move, i are the 3 possible moves of her opponent, and the
πij (0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7) are the coefficients of the pay-off matrix. The mean field
approximation neglects fluctuations among agents representations, their Jj.
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Hence agent j evaluates the probability of her opponent’s moves according
to her own estimations, using Boltzman functions of her own J .
Using statistical physics notation Z :
Z =
∑
i
exp(βJi) (6)
the internal representation of the agent is thus vector (J1, J2, J3) which com-
ponents obey dynamics :
dJ1
dt
= −γJ1 + (exp(βJ1) ∗ 0.7 ∗ exp(βJ3))/Z/Z (7)
dJ2
dt
= −γJ2 + (exp(βJ2) ∗ 0.5(exp(βJ2) + exp(βJ3))/Z/Z (8)
dJ3
dt
= −γJ3 + exp(βJ3) ∗ 0.3/Z (9)
Taking the exponentials as new variables simplifies expressions (7-9) and
allows to deduce scaling properties. Let :
x = exp(βJ1), J1 = log(x)/β (10)
y = exp(βJ2), J2 = log(y)/β (11)
z = exp(βJ3), J3 = log(z)/β (12)
The new equations are :
dx
βdt
= x(−αlog(x) + 0.7
xz
s2
) (13)
dy
βdt
= y(−αlog(y) + 0.5
y(y + z)
s2
) (14)
dz
βdt
= z(−αlog(z) + 0.3
z
s
) (15)
with s = x+ y + z.
Expressions (13-15) show that a single parameter α = γ
β
determines equi-
librium conditions, an improvement on (Axtell et al., 2001) who needed two
parameters ǫ and memory size. Phase transition diagrams will then be drawn
varying β while keeping γ = 0.05 constant. β plays the role of a kinetic coeffi-
cient, increasing the characteristic time towards equilibrium. The magnitude
of the J coefficients at equilibrium scales as 1/γ.
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3.2 Mean field analysis : Attractors and transitions
The state of the system is described by the set of the preference coeffi-
cients J1, J2 and J3 of the agents, i.e. their estimated profit divided by γ
for the three possible moves resp. H, M and L. This is an improvement with
respect to (Axtell et al., 2001) which space phase dimension was three times
the memory size. Our analysis can then proceed using the more powerful me-
thods of dynamical systems and statistical mechanics rather the Markovian
formulation proposed in (Axtell et al., 2001).
Trajectories in the J phase space are obtained by solving the mean field
equations (4-5) using a Rosenbrock integrator (GRIND et al., 2017). Grids of
trajectories help to figure out attractors and attraction basins. Since we can-
not draw sets of 3 trajectories, we display their projections in plans (J1, J2)
, (J1, J3) and (J3, J2) for a given choice of β = 2, γ = 0.05 in figure (1). The
trajectories start at regular interval in the projection plan with the same
third J coordinate.
Three attractors can be observed : one with large J2 when move M is
the preferred choice by all agents, to be called the M attractor ; one with
large J3 when move L is the preferred choice by all agents, to be called the
L attractor ; and one with lower values of J1, J2 and J3, to be called the HL
attractor.
The Mean Field analysis readily tells us that two of the attractors are
such that all agents always play the same strategy either M or L.
The dependence of the J’s upon the reduced parameter β/γ is displayed
on the continuation plot of figure 2. We clearly identify the 3 same attractors
in the ordered regime above β = 0.57, and only one attractor left with move
M as the preferred choice for lower β values 0.3 < β < 0.57. The bifurcation
is observed around β ≈ 0.57. A steep, but not abrupt, transition further
occurs when β ≈ 0.3 to a disordered regime such that agents do not display
strong preferences for any choice.
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Figure 1 – Grids of trajectories projected on the (J1, J2) plan starting from
J3 = 5 (above left), on the (J1, J3) plan starting from J2 = 0.5 (above right)
and on the (J3, J2) plan starting from J1 = 6 (below left). The black triangles
figure the initial conditions of the individual trajectories. β = 2, γ = 0.05 .
The fourth set of projections on the (J1, J3) plan starting from J2 = 0.5
(below right) was obtained just above the bifurcation for β = 0.58. and
γ = 0.05 . The L and HL attractors get closer and the basin of attraction
of the HL attractor is strongly reduced by the widening of the M attractor.
GRIND et al. (2017) software.
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Figure 2 – Bifurcation diagram obtained by integration of the mean field
equations. γ = 0.05 . (The continuation algorithm failed to converge to the
exact position of the bifurcation around β ≈ 0.57 ). Attractor M is colou-
red blue, attractor L is coloured red and attractor HL is coloured green.
GRIND et al. (2017) software.
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4 Agent-based simulations
4.1 Average analysis
Let us now compare the above results with those directly obtained by
agent-based simulations. At each time step a pair of agents is randomly cho-
sen. They play the bargaining game choosing their move with a probability
given by equation (2) using their own specific Jj (not an average Jj as in the
mean field approximation), which they update after the session. And so on.
We here report 4 types of results :
— On figure 3 the phase transition diagram (to be compared with figure
2).
— On figure 4 individual trajectories in the J simplex.
— On figure 5 the distribution of individual J ’s on 4 attractors.
— On figure 6 a sketch of the attraction basins.
We first monitor the different Jj averaged over the whole population at
equilibrium when β is scanned downward and upward between 0 and 2 (fi-
gure 3). For the β decreasing branches Jid, we start at β = 2 from initial
distributions of Jj close to one of the attractors for each branch and carry on
integration until the attractor is reached. The branches are continued when
β is lowered, taking as initial conditions the previous values of Jj on the
attractor. The equivalent method is applied when β is increased from 0 for
the Jim branches. For the sake of clarity, attractors HL and attractor L are
represented resp. on the upper and lower plots.
Only attractor M can be reached when β is increased from the disordered
attractor. When β > 0.571, the path is reversible, but a hysteresis cycle is
observed when β crosses the bifurcation.
In the ordered region, the transition from attractor HL to attractor M is
direct. By contrast, one first observes a continuous transition from L to HL
around β = 0.75 above the sharp transition at the bifurcation.
Some attractor levels can be readily obtained from equilibrium conditions
of equations (10-12). When only one move j is chosen by the agents, the
fraction involving exponentials equals 1 and the value of Jj is given by :
Jj =
πi
γ
(16)
in accordance with simulation results : on attractor M J2 reaches 0.5/0.05 =
10 and on attractor L J3 reaches 0.3/0.05 = 6. In the case of the disordered
attractor for low β values, the exponentials are close to one and the Jj are
directly computed from equations (10-12).
Phase diagrams of the mean field approximation and of the agent-based
simulations look pretty similar with the same attractors ; the main difference
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Figure 3 – Bifurcation diagrams obtained by AB simulations. The six lines
on each plot are values of the 3 preference coefficients J measured during β
decrease between 0 and 2 (J1d e.g.) and then increase (J1m e.g.) from 0 to 2.
The decrease is started from the mixed attractor HL on the upper plot, and
from the uniform L attractor on the lower plot. Reversibility is only observed
in the low β or in the high β region but not across the β = 0.571 transition.
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is the dependence of J upon β for the HL attractor observed in the Mean
Field Approximation.
4.2 Individual positions
The previous results concerned global features. Let us now examine in-
dividual agent choices. We use a simplex representation as in Axtell et al.
(2001). At any time step, preference coefficients J of an agent are displayed
on the simplex by a point which position corresponds to the center of gravity
of masses proportional to J1, J2, J3 placed at vertices H, M, L. For instance
an agent positioned close to the center of the simplex is indifferent to choice
H, M or L, while any agent close to one of the vertices has strong preferences
and mostly plays according to that vertex.
Figure (4) represents a typical set of 30 agents trajectories in the simplex
for β = 2 and γ = 0.05 during 10000 integration steps (each agent has been
sampled 666 times on average). We started from a uniform distribution of
initial J ’s of width 2 centered around (2.0, 2.0, 2.0). Their positions are
indicated by a small square. Trajectories are distinctively coloured. After a
few initial wanderings, they diverge in the direction of the closest vertex. They
remain fixed in the case of L and M vertices. Some might fluctuate around
vertex H because of possible encounters with high demanding opponents
which result in the decrease of J3.
Each of the 16 simplices on figure (5) is a snapshot of agents’ Js after a
given integration time for a given value of β and for γ = 0.05.
Each red point represents the set of preference coefficients of a single
agent. Each line of vertices displays the evolution of agents preferences at
increasing iteration times towards one of the 4 asymptotic configurations for
a given value of β.
The initial conditions where chosen to favour the attractor to be dis-
played. We used uniform distributions of width 1.0 around (0.9, 0.9, 0.9)
for the disordered attractor, D, around (1.0, 0.6, 1.0) for the M attractor,
around (1.0, 0.6, 3.0) for the HL attractor and around (0.6, 0.6, 6.5) for the
L attractor.
In agreement with previous observations, we see on the first line of figure
(5) that for low β values the agents positions remain dispersed inside the
simplex even for long iteration times, which corresponds to a disordered
phase.
By contrast when β is increased, agents in the ordered phase gather to-
wards one or two vertices, even after much smaller iteration times. We have
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H M
L
Figure 4 – Individual trajectories across the simplex. Initial positions close
to the center are indicated by little squares. β = 2, γ = 0.95, 10000 integra-
tion steps.
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chosen intermediate values of β to avoid the accumulation of representative
points on simplex vertices which would be observed at larger β values, e.g.
β = 2.
A physical interpretation of the above results would be a comparison with
a condensed phase with thermal excitations above the ground state. When β
further increases, an equivalent of temperature decrease in physical systems,
agents preferences condense exactly on the vertices (see further figure (6)), a
property which helps us to check the basins of attraction.
4.3 Basins of attraction
The next question concerns the extension of the basins of attraction of the
different attractors. In fact, a systematic search for β = 2, γ = 0.05 displays
many more attractors than expected from our preliminary scans.
Figuring basins of attraction in a 3D phase space is not obvious and
we once again use a vertex representation. The data are obtained by a triple
scan of initial conditions. Each initial condition is a uniform distribution of J’s
values of width 1.0 around a given center. For instance, an initial distribution
centered on the center of gravity of the simplex is randomly drawn in the
cube : 2.7 < J1 < 3.7 , 2.7 < J2 < 3.7 , 2.7 < J3 < 3.7. The upper circle of
figure 6 corresponds to the initial distribution : 0.3 < J1 < 1.3 , 0.3 < J2 <
1.3 , 2.7 < J3 < 3.7 etc.
Figure (6) describes data gathered by 3 nested loops across initial J1, J2, J3,
where distribution centers are varied from 0.4 to 6.4 by a factor 2. The posi-
tions of the centers of the circles in the simplex codes the initial distribution
centers. We used the condensation of agents preferences on the 3 vertices to
display final distributions by pie charts. Red sectors represent the percentage
of agents with choice H, blue sectors represent the percentage of agents with
choice M, green sectors represent the percentage of agents with choice L.
Rare and narrow white sectors represent the percentage of agents inside the
simplex. We checked that they are located in the immediate neighbourhood
of vertices.
Several important conclusions about ordered phases for large β can be
drawn :
— Mixed strategies inside the vertex are unstable.
— The attractors are distributions of agents on the vertices or very close.
Agents have strong opinions about the value of their choice and don’t
change them frequently.
— J space is paved with basins of attraction surrounding the attractors.
The dynamics collapse choices to the nearest vertex, with the excep-
tion of vertex H.
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β=0.2
D
      200000       400000       800000      1600000 
β=0.4
M
        2000         4000         8000        16000 
β=0.8
HL
        2000         4000         8000        16000 
β=0.8
L
        2000         4000         8000        16000 
Figure 5 – Evolution of agents positions for different values of β. γ =
0.05. Each 4 simplex line represents the position of agents J’s after different
iteration times written at the bottom of the simplex. β values are 0.2, 0.4
and twice 0.8 for the different lines. Initial conditions are given in the text.
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Figure 6 – Simplex representation of the basin of attractions. The position
of the circles in the simplex codes the initial conditions. Each circle codes the
percentage of agents who reached the 3 vertices. Red sectors represent the
percentage of agents with choice H, blue sectors represent the percentage of
agents with choice M, green sectors represent the percentage of agents with
choice L. Rare and narrow white sectors represent the percentage of agents
inside the simplex. β = 2.0, γ = 0.05, 100 agents, 100000 iteration steps.
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— No distribution consists of only H preferences - which would give no
gain to the agents. When the initial conditions are close to vertex H,
the attractors can only be mixed distributions, with very few agents
playing M.
— (Axtell et al., 2001) and (Poza et al., 2011) report the existence of
"fractious attractor" such that agents oscillate between choices H and
L for long transient. We never observed such "fractious attractor",
even after a specific search, and we suspect that they were due to
their choice of a constant noise term.
5 Tagged populations
The most striking result in Axtell et al. (2001) is the existence of an in-
equity norm sustainable among two a priori equivalent tagged groups. Their
inequity norm corresponds in our settings to an attractor such that all mem-
bers of one population with tag T1 play H against any member of the other
tagged population (T2) who always plays L against them.
To investigate the basins of attractions for the two tagged populations we
proceed with the same scan of initial conditions of population with tag T2
as above, but maintain the same initial conditions for population with tag
T1 around the center of the simplex :
2.5 < J1 < 3.5 , 2.5 < J2 < 3.5 , 2.5 < J3 < 3.2.
Figure 7 displays the attractors of the inter-population dynamics, the
simplex T1 above simplex T2 with the same conventions as in figure 5, ex-
cept that the positions on both simplices correspond to the scan of initial
conditions of population T2. The colour codes are the same as for figure 6
and reflects the attractors of each population.
The pie charts close to the left vertices of the simplices e.g. are coloured
green for T1 and red for T2 ; the attractors of the dynamics are then L for
T1 and H for T2. The pie charts close to the top vertices correspond to a
stable mixture of the 3 possible moves H,M,L for T1 and to pure L for T2
The pie charts close to the right vertices correspond to a stable mixture of 2
possible moves M,L for T1 and to pure M for T2.
Not surprisingly, the attractors reflect the initial conditions of population
T2 since the initial conditions of T1 were kind of neutral.
The main difference with the no-tag simulation is the appearance of a
pure strategy attractor such that all agents with tag T2 play H against agents
with tag T1 who play L. This asymmetrical attractor parallel the findings of
(Axtell et al., 2001) who refer to a "discriminatory norm". But our analysis
characterises an attractor reached from initial conditions that were already
17
biased towards inequity with larger values of J1. And this condition is an
attractor of the dynamics, not a transient.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The reformulation of the iterated bargaining game of (Axtell et al., 2001)
using more elaborate cognitive processes such as taking moving averages of
past gains and choosing next moves according to Boltzman probabilities al-
lows a more precise description of the dynamics in terms of attractors, regime
transitions and basins of attraction. The number of parameters was reduced
from two to one. Several transitions are observed between a disordered state
and several stable ordered configurations when β increases. Because we use
Boltzman choice function, agents end-up using mostly pure strategies for
larger values of β. We never observed any "fractious state" such that agents
remain in the interior of the simplex changing randomly their choice between
H and L as reported in (Axtell et al., 2001) and (Poza et al., 2011). Our guess
is that such behaviour is due to their hypothesis of a random choice with a
constant non-zero probability.
As discussed earlier in sections 4.3 and 5, J space is paved with basins
of attraction surrounding the attractors and dynamics collapse preference
coefficients to the nearest vertex. Unbiased random initial conditions never
generate H/L attractors.
Hence our interpretation in terms of social phenomena : game interactions
and cognitive processes can increase and stabilise discrimination and inequa-
lity among tagged populations, even when tag were a priori neutral. On
the other hand, inequality attractors never "emerge" 1 spontaneously from
random unbiased initial conditions.
The changes we introduced in (Axtell et al., 2001) also allow to figure out
which properties can be considered as generic, that is to say independent from
the details of each model, and which are specific to the exact formulation of
the model.
The two versions of the iterated bargaining game, (Axtell et al., 2001)
and the present paper, agree that unfair social institutions such as classes
and discrimination can result as the downside of a rational cognitive practice,
namely memorising or coding previous events to take present decisions. And
furthermore, that taking into account a priori irrelevant tags can lead to a
1. (Axtell et al., 2001) specify in a footnote that they "use the term "emergent" ... to
mean simply "arising from the local interactions of agents." ". But the word Emergence in
the title of their paper evokes the idea of emergence of Classes in a previously egalitarian
society.
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Figure 7 – Simplex representations of the basin of attractions for two tagged
populations of 100 agents, one with tag T1 above and one with tag T2 below.
As previously, colours code the attractors of the dynamics with the same
coding as in figure 6. Positions in the simplex code the initial conditions of
players with tag T2 for both groups while initial conditions of tag T1 players
remain identical around the center of the simplex. β = 2.0, γ = 0.05, 100 000
iteration steps per data.
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dissociation of the two tagged populations into an upper and a lower class.
But we differ by our interpretation in terms of social phenomena : game
interactions and cognitive processes can increase and stabilise discrimination,
but inequality attractors never "emerge" spontaneously from random unbia-
sed initial conditions. History has taught us that wars and invasions often
result into discriminations that are maintained long after these events.
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